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SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM AND THE SUPPORT FOR 
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The provision of pensions for the old and public education for the young represent a 
large share of public budgets. In most Western countries, current Social Security systems are 
under a big financial stress. Several reforms have been proposed to solve this problem. This 
paper deals with the impact that some of these reforms have, through a political process, on 
publicly financed education. We develop a model linking both public transfer schemes, in 
which heterogeneous individuals vote the educational tax. Our findings show that most of the 
proposals that entail a partial privatization of the pension system have a negative impact on 
public education and, thus, on economic growth. 
Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: D72, H55, I22, J24. 
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Several proposals have been put forward to improve the long-run solvency problems of
the Social Security systems in modern economies.1 Stiglitz (2000) classiﬁes them into
two categories. In the ﬁrst place, a group of proposals that only entail modest changes.
They try to restore the balance of the system by either cutting down expenditures or
increasing revenues. An example is the proposal of increasing the age of retirement.
In the second place, a group of more drastic reforms that involve signiﬁcant struc-
tural changes. The most drastic reform would replace the unfunded deﬁned-beneﬁt
system (also called pay-as-you-go or simply PAYGO system) currently at work in
most countries, with a funded deﬁned-contribution system, in which individuals make
contributions to individual accounts. These accounts could be managed by private
companies that invest contributions in assets.2 Diﬀerent arguments have been sug-
gested to convince the public about the desirability of abandoning the current PAYGO
system in favor of a privatized, funded system. For example, a funded pension sys-
tem is less aﬀected by adverse demographics, it enhances savings, it gives better
labor market incentives and it yields a greater rate of return. However, Geanokoplos,
Mitchell and Zeldes (1998), for example, show that, once transition costs are properly
taken into account, it is no longer true that a funded system could yield a greater
rate of return than the current system.
Although many authors have addressed the issue of reforming pension systems,
to the best of our knowledge none accounts for the implications of such proposals
on other public transfer schemes or taxation levels. The objective of this paper is to
study the eﬀects of reforming public pensions systems on publicly ﬁnanced education,
when the tax to ﬁnance education is determined through voting.
The literature dealing with the connection existing between pension systems and
public education has focused on justifying the existence of both public schemes. The
standard argument is that the existence of combined public pensions and public
1See the book by Gruber and Wise (1999) for an excellent description of the problems that pension
systems face in several OECD countries.
2See also Gruber and Wise (2001) for an overview of alternative reform proposals.
3education is in some way, the result of an implicit intergenerational contract.3 We
abstract from that issue and we take both transfer schemes for granted.
Other authors have also stressed the importance of public educational policy
on growth (Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Eckstein and Zilcha (1994)).4 As most
modern societies are democracies, it is obvious that there must be a widespread
agreement on the fact that the government must subsidy education, out of the public
budget. Also since Lucas (1988) and Becker et Al. (1990), endogenous growth models
have emphasized investment in human capital as one of the main engines of growth.
In this paper, we look at education as investment in human capital. So, if one of
the main engines of growth is human capital, and the bulk of the investment in
human capital comes from the public budget, we need to address the issue of how the
proposals to reform public pension systems may aﬀect the political will of society to
support publicly ﬁnanced education and, thus, on the growth rate of the economy.
We construct a model of endogenous growth where individuals live three periods.
Individuals within generations are heterogeneous and selﬁsh.5 Generations are linked
through the tax-transfer system at work: In the ﬁrst period of their lives, individuals
attend public schools that are publicly ﬁnanced. In the second period they work,
and pay the education of the young and the pensions of the old. In the third period
they are retired and collect their pension beneﬁts. During the second period of their
lives, agents take part in a political process where they choose the subsidy for public
education. They are willing to subsidy public education today as long as this has a
positive eﬀect on their income via their future pensions. A better quality of public
education today leads the economy to higher growth in the future which, in turn, will
make future pensions higher. We claim that this link between future pensions and the
quality of current education is a crucial aspect of an unfunded system. An unfunded
system conveys that pensions of today’s workers will be paid out of contributions of
tomorrow’s workers, who, on the other hand, are today’s student. Therefore, today’s
3See Becker and Murphy (1986) and, more recently, Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes (2004).
4In the OECD countries, public expenditure on education represents, on average, 88% of total
expenditure in educational institutions (see Education at a Glance-2002 edition).
5In this model we abstract from the issue of intergenerational altruism to stress the importance
of the interrelation between both transfer schemes when evaluating reforms to the social security.
4workers must be interested in investing in education for the young.6 The current
design of the pension system makes public education socially palatable. However, if
the current system is replaced with a (partially) privatized funded system, the link
between future pensions and the quality of current education becomes weaker and,
in the extreme case of full privatization, completely vanishes.
The idea that there is a link between the accumulation of human capital by the
young and the payment of pensions to the old was already perceived in earlier liter-
ature.7 However, this idea has not been systematically considered. Our contribution
to this branch of the literature is, precisely, the development of a simple model on
the political economy of public education and on endogenous growth in which the
relationship between investment in human capital, through a publicly ﬁnanced edu-
cation, and the pension system is formally established.8 This allows us to analyze
the impact of pension reform on the political support for public education.
We propose three diﬀerent ways of reforming the pension systems. Two of them
entail the diversion of some funds from the current PAYGO scheme to mandatory
individual accounts (MIRAs). As a result, these two particular reforms always have
a negative impact on the quality level of current education. We also study a reform
in which the PAYGO scheme remains unchanged, and individuals are forced to make
additional contributions to MIRAs. In this case, we see that the eﬀect on education is
negative only in the case when the decisive voter (the median voter) is an individual
who does not save.
Finally, we consider a diﬀerent scenario where some part of the agents’ contribu-
tion is used to set up a fund, instead of building individual accounts. Although this
type of reform could be seen as very diﬀerent from the one above, we see that the
eﬀect on public education is exactly the same.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model.
6In a rather diﬀerent vein, Belletini and Berti-Ceroni (1999) suggest that a pure unfunded pay-as-
you-go (PAYGO) system provides the taxpayers with the right incentives to support growth-oriented
policies.
7See Pogue and Sgontz (1977) and Richman and Stagner (1986).
8Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) also considered the relationship between these two public expen-
ditures. However, in their model this link is captured by the government’s social optimization who
has to allocate tax revenues between these two programs.
5We describe the pension system in Section 3. We prove the existence of a voting
equilibrium for the tax rate that ﬁnances public education in Section 4. We explore
diﬀerent reforms of the Social Security system and see their implications on the budget
for public education in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Let us consider an economy populated by a continuum of families consisting of one
young agent, one middle-aged and one old. Population is constant: an equal mass
of each generation is alive in each period and this mass is normalized to one. Young
agents go to school; middle-aged agents work, splitting their income between con-
sumption and savings for retirement; old agents live in retirement and consume.
There is no uncertainty.
We consider only two periods, labelled 0 and 1. Those who are young at period 0
are middle-aged at period 1, those who are middle-aged at period 0 are old at period
1, and those who are old at period 0 die at the end of that period. Agents within a
generation are diﬀerentiated by the stock of human capital that they possess.
All the decisions are taken by the middle-aged agents. All of them have identical
preferences over their levels of consumption in periods 0 and 1. Preferences are






1), with ρ ∈ (0,1), (1)
where ci
0 and ci
1 are the consumption levels of individual i in periods 0 and 1, respec-
tively, and ρ represents the subjective discount rate. The function u(·) is increasing
and concave in c. In order to avoid corner solutions, u (0) = +∞.
Production takes place according to a constant-returns-to scale technology repre-
sented by a production function similar to that of De Gregorio (1996) and Galor and
Tsiddon (1997):
Yt = F(Kt,h tLt) ≡ htLtf(kt), (2)
where kt ≡ Kt
htLt,Y t is aggregate output, Kt is aggregate capital, ht is the average level
6of human capital, and Lt is aggregate (raw) labor. The second input, htLt, can be
seen as eﬃciency labor. The function f(kt) has all the standard properties needed to
guarantee the existence of an interior solution to the producers’ proﬁt maximization
problem. Producers operate in a perfectly competitive market. Then:
1+rt = f (kt) (3)
wt = f(kt) − f (kt)kt, (4)
where rt i st h er a t eo fi n t e r e s ta n dwt is the real wage per eﬃciency unit of labor.
We take rt a sg i v e na tt h ew o r l dl e v e lr. This assumption is often called “small
open economy” in the literature (see Galor and Tsiddon(1997)). This implies that kt
and wt are also ﬁxed. We set wt ≡ 1. Note that, as population is constant, the only
source of growth is ht, the average level of human capital.
In period 0, every middle-aged agent has one unit of labor time which she supplies
inelastically. She earns a pre-tax salary hi
0, interpreted as her stock of human capital.
Human capital is distributed on some interval [a,b] ⊂ (0,+∞), a c c o r d i n gt os o m e
distribution function G(hi
0), with mean h0 and median hm
0 .
Next we describe the technology of human capital accumulation. Following Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992), the stock of human capital of each oﬀspring in period 1 is
determined by the stock of human capital of the parent and by the “quality” of public




with θe > 0,θee < 0,θh > 0, θhh < 0 and θ(0,h i
0)=θ(e,0) = 0. These assumptions
are standard. Both factors (e and hi
0) have a positive eﬀect, but diminishing returns
apply. Note also that we are assuming implicitly that the young have no resources
to invest in their own education.
The role of the government is twofold. First, the government manages the Social
Security system. This Social Security system imposes a payroll tax on wages. In-
dividuals are entitled to a pension beneﬁt when they are old. Workers contribute a
7fraction λ0 of their salary in period 0. When retired in period 1, they get a pension
beneﬁt bi
1. In the next section, we describe the pension system in detail.
Second, the government collects a proportional tax τ on labor income to ﬁnance






The quality of public education e is a function of total revenue. We write e = ϕ(τh0),
where ϕ  > 0,ϕ   ≤ 0 and ϕ (0) = +∞. Note that the quality of the public school is
the same for all children. From equations (2) and (3), it is clear that the quality of
public education e and the rate of growth of the economy are positively related. At
this point, we can write the individual constraints as:
ci









0 represents savings and R =( 1+r) is the return on savings.
We assume that the only political decision facing working generation in this econ-
omy is to vote on the level of the subsidy for public education, represented by the
tax rate on labor income, τ.
3T h e P e n s i o n S y s t e m
This section describes the pension system. We propose two alternatives. Both com-
bine a PAYGO scheme with a funded scheme, but they diﬀer in the design of the
funded scheme. The funded scheme in the ﬁrst system entails the set-up of Mandatory
Individual Retirement Accounts (MIRAs). The second system combines the PAYGO
scheme with the construction of a fund that the Social Security administration invests
in assets. We call this scheme a Trust Fund system.
3.1 PAYGO plus MIRAs
The contribution in period 0 of a worker whose stock of human capital is hi
0 is λ0hi
0.
This contribution is split into two parts. An amount λM
0 hi
0 goes to the MIRA of
8individual i. The remainder, λP
0 hi
0, is used to pay the PAYGO beneﬁts of those
currently retired in period 0. We assume λM
0 ,λP
0 ≥ 0, and λM
0 + λP
0 = λ0. Total













0 h0 + λP
0 h0 = λ0h0. (9)
The amount λM
0 h0 is invested in assets and serves to pay the MIRA beneﬁts in
period 1, while λP
0 h0 i sd e v o t e dt op a yp e n s i o n si np e r i o d0 .I np e r i o d1 ,t h e r ea r e
two sources of funds for paying pensions. First is the amount RλM
0 h0, which is the
capitalized value of all individual accounts. Second is the amount λP
1 h1, which comes
from total future contributions in period 1, T1. Then, the average pension beneﬁti n
period 1 is:
b1 = RλM
0 h0 + λP
1 h1, (10)
where h1 is the average level of human capital in period 1.
However, in most pension systems, not all individuals enjoy the same beneﬁts.
The reason is twofold. First, the existence of individual accounts (the MIRA scheme).
Second, the possibility that the PAYGO beneﬁt be partly related to past contribu-
tions. To capture this second possibility, we deﬁne Di(α) as a redistributive factor
according to the expression:
Di(α)=
%





, where α ∈ [0,1]. (11)
To sum up, a worker of period 0 whose stock of human capital is hi
0 gets the
following pension beneﬁt bi














The beneﬁt has three tiers. First, a MIRA beneﬁt RλM
0 hi
0. Second, a universal
pension beneﬁt, αλP
1 h1, which is unrelated to past contributions and is ﬁnanced on
a PAYGO basis. Third, a pension beneﬁtw h i c hi sa l s oﬁnanced on a PAYGO basis,





If α =1 , all individuals get exactly the same PAYGO beneﬁt, while if α =0the
PAYGO beneﬁts are proportional to past contributions.

















3.2 PAYGO plus Trust Fund
Under this system, some part of the contributions is diverted to build up a fund,
instead of going to individual accounts. This fund is invested in assets by the Social
Security administration and is used to help pay pension beneﬁts in the next period.
In particular, a fraction λT
0 of the contributions is diverted to the fund. As above, if
an individual contributes λ0hi
0 to the system, the amount λP
0 hi
0 goes to pay current
pensions, while λT
0 hi
0 goes to the fund. Again, we have λT
0 ,λP
0 ≥ 0, λT
0 + λP
0 = λ0,
and the total revenue is also λ0h0. The average pension is
b1 = RλT
0 h0 + λP
1 h1. (14)
The diﬀerence with the previous case is that now the beneﬁts coming from the
fund are subject to the same redistribution as the beneﬁts that come from the PAYGO










0 h0 + λP
1 h1]. (15)
Again, it is easy to see that this pension system is feasible. Summing up, in period 0





0 ), and α. This general framework allows us to consider
several interesting particular cases:





Every individual gets a pension which is simply the capitalized value of her con-





In this example the government merely imitates a private pension scheme.
10Example 2: Pure PAYGO (λM
0 =0 ;λT
0 =0 )










If α =1 , all individuals receive the same pension beneﬁt, which is the average




The average pension depends only on the average stock of human capital in period
1. Pension systems in which all individuals get the same beneﬁta r es o m e t i m e sc a l l e d
Beveridgean. Countries where the pension system is approximately Beveridgean are
Canada and The Netherlands.








Pension systems in which pensions are proportional to past contributions are called
Bismarckian. Germany and France have such pension systems. For most pension
systems in the world α lies somewhere between 0 and 1.
Example 3: Fully Funded Trust System (λP
0 = λP
1 =0 ;λ0 = λT
0 )
All the revenue that the system collects in period 0 is pooled together in a fund.
The fund is invested in assets to pay pensions in period 1. However, there can be
some degree of redistribution. In particular, the pension beneﬁti s :
bi







Throughout this section, we ﬁx all the parameters describing the Social Security
system. Each worker has to choose a consumption stream and an ideal tax rate to
fund education, τ, taking into account her consumption decision. Finally, once every
11individual has chosen her preferred tax rate, society will choose a value for the tax
rate with the property of being a Condorcet winner.9
As a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider the case in which individuals can borrow against
their pension beneﬁts of period 1. In general, this possibility is ruled out by legis-
lation (see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999)) and pension beneﬁts cannot be used
as collateral for a loan. However, this case is worth an analysis to facilitate the
exposition of the general case, where borrowing against pensions is not allowed.
4.1 Individuals may borrow against future pensions
Step 1: Savings
Each middle-aged agent chooses her savings for period 1, taking the tax rate




















Since optimal savings can be either positive or negative, the following ﬁrst-order






As preferences are homothetic, we know that the income expansion path in the space
(ci
0,c i
1) is a straight line that passes through the origin. That is, there is some
positive constant Ω so that ci∗
1 = Ωci∗
0 .10 This implies that the optimal levels of
consumption ci∗
0 and ci∗
1 can be written as a constant fraction of intertemporal income




R+Ωyi. We can also deﬁne optimal savings as












0 =( 1− τ − λ0)hi
0 − ci∗
0 .11
Without a pension system, it is obvious that all individuals would have positive
savings to ﬁnance retirement. Moreover, individuals with a high stock of human
capital will save more than individuals with a low stock of human capital. However,
when there is a pension system, some individuals may choose not to save. Intuitively,
if the pension system is generous enough, poor workers can choose to borrow against
their future pension beneﬁts. Without any restriction on the parameters of the model,
savings could even be decreasing in the stock of human capital. This would happen
if the return of the pension system is higher than the return from savings and the
payroll tax is large enough. Individuals have two ways of transferring income from
period 0 to period 1. They can either save or contribute to the pension system. If
this second alternative yields a higher return than the ﬁrst one, they will not be very
eager to save. They will have negative private savings in period 0 and will use their
Social Security payments in period 1 to consume and to repay their loans. We need
the following assumption since we want to avoid this possibility.
Assumption 1 (i) R>h1




Part (i) says that the return on capital is always greater than the rate of growth
of human capital. It implies that, on average, a pure PAYGO system always gives a
lower return than a pure FF system. This assumption provides the major justiﬁcation
for Social Security reform (see Feldstein (1996), (1998) and Kotlikoﬀ (1996)).12 If the
opposite were true, it would be diﬃcult to argue in favor of a reform of the pension
system. Part (ii) imposes an upper bound on the payroll tax or a lower bound on





1−γ for γ  =1
ln(c) for γ =1 .
Then Ω =( ρR)













h0, one possible criticism to our model is that the PAYGO system is not the most
eﬃcient way to achieve within-generation redistribution. We have two answers to this criticism.
First, we are not interested in this paper in justifying the existence of a PAYGO system, that we
take for granted. Second, if we were to justify the existence of a PAYGO system, we would use
a political argument. In particular, we can provide a condition that guarantees that the decisive
voter prefers a PAYGO system rather than a Funded System. We discuss brieﬂyt h i si s s u ei nt h e
Appendix.
13the slope Ω. Part (iii) requires that the size of the PAYGO scheme will not rise from
period 0 to period 1. We have the following proposition (see the Appendix for a
proof).
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, there exists a strictly positive
number τ, such that for all τ belonging to the interval [0,τ], savings are increasing
with the stock of human capital. Moreover, τ > 1 − λ0(Ω+R
Ω ) > 0.
In order to illustrate the proposition, suppose that the utility function is u =l n ( c).
In that case, Ω = ρR. We set ρ =0 .55 as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999). Part
(ii) of Assumption 1 implies λ0 < 0.355. Then, if λ0 =0 .1 τ > 0.72. If λ0 =0 .2
τ > 0.44. If λ0 =0 .3, τ > 0.15. This gives an idea of the range of admissible values of
the parameters. In the sequel, we assume that τ < τ, which guarantees that savings
are increasing with the stock of human capital. Another implication of Assumption 1
is the following: if the savings of an individual with a stock of human capital hi
0 are
strictly positive, this will also be the case for all individuals with a stock of human
capital greater than hi
0.
Step 2: The tax rate
Given her optimal consumption decision, each individual has to choose her ideal
tax rate, τ. We plug the optimal values ci∗
0 and ci∗
1 into the utility function and
we use the private budget constraints (7) and (8), the human capital accumulation
rule (5) and the government budget constraint (6), to obtain the indirect utility
function V i(τ). Eliminating constant terms, we see that maximizing her indirect
utility function consists simply of maximizing the present value of her lifetime income
yi.13 We write yi(τ) to stress the dependence on the tax rate. Since yi(τ) is strictly
concave with respect to τ, 14 the ideal tax rate for individual i, which we call τi,















13Note that this is a direct implication of Fisher’s Separation Theorem.
14I nt h eA p p e n d i xw ep r o v et h a ty
i(τ) is strictly concave.
14The the left-hand side is the marginal cost of the tax for education, while the term
on the right is its marginal beneﬁt through the positive eﬀect that public education
has on the pension beneﬁt of period 1. The right-hand side decreases with τ, which
means that this positive eﬀect has diminishing returns.
From (23) we see that the higher the stock of human capital of an individual is,
the lower her preferred tax rate is. Then, there is a Condorcet winner τ∗,w h i c h
corresponds to the ideal tax rate of the individual whose stock of human capital is
the median of the distribution, namely hm
0 .T h a ti s ,τ∗ = τm.
4.2 Introducing borrowing constraints
Now we study the case in which savings are constrained to be non-negative. In the
sequel, therefore, we impose the constraint that si
0 ≥ 0. Those individuals for whom
t h ec o n s t r a i n ti sb i n d i n ga r ec a l l e dsaving-constrained individuals. We will see that
all saving-constrained individuals vote for a lower tax rate than the one they would
have chosen if they were allowed to borrow.




(1 − τ − λ0)hi
0 − ci∗
0 if τ ≤ e τi
0 if τ > e τi,
(24)
where e τi is deﬁned implicitly by setting si
0 =0in the ﬁrst-order condition (22). So,
e τi is deﬁned by:
u [(1 − e τi − λ0)hi
0] − ρRu [bi
1 (e τi)] = 0. (25)
This cut-oﬀ value of the tax rate for individual i has the following interpretation.
Suppose that borrowing is allowed. Then, individual i would like to borrow against
her pension beneﬁt whenever τ > e τi. As this is banned, her savings are zero for
any value of τ > e τi.W e c a n c h e c k t h a t e τi grows along with the stock of human
capital. This implies that, when the tax rate is low, only individuals with a low stock
of human capital are saving-constrained. As the tax rate rises, the proportion of
saving-constrained individual also rises.
Our next task is to see which is now the preferred tax rate of every individual.
For our purposes, it is necessary to study the shape of the indirect utility function.
15We deﬁne V ir(τ) as the function obtained by setting si
0 =0in the utility function of
individual i.
V ir(τ)= u[(1 − τ − λ0)hi
0]+ρu[bi
1 (τ)]. (26)
The indirect utility function of i when borrowing is not allowed is the following:
Wi(τ)=
+
V i(τ) for τ ≤ e τi
V ir(τ) for τ > e τi.
(27)
We are going to prove that Wi(τ) is single-peaked. Suppose we extend the func-
tion V ir(τ) to the whole interval [0,1]. It has the following properties:
i) It is strictly concave.
ii) It is always strictly below V i(τ), except at e τi, where their graphs are tangent
to each other.
iii) It attains a maximum at τir < τi.
iv) Again, the higher the stock of human capital is, the lower τir is.
Properties (i), (ii), and (iv) are immediate. We prove Property (iii). To simplify
notation, we write V ir(τ)=u[e ci
0]+ρu[e ci
1], where e ci
0 =( 1−τ −λ0)hi
0 and e ci
1 = bi
1 (τ).
































1 ] =1 . At (e ci
0, e ci
1) the individual is saving-
constrained, which means that e ci
0 <c i∗
0 and e ci
1 >c i∗






implies that τir < τi. It is interesting to see the intuition behind the inequality
τir < τi. When an individual cannot borrow, her consumption in period 0 is lower
and her consumption in period 1 is higher than the corresponding consumptions of her
unrestricted optimum (when borrowing is possible). In other words, her consumption
is too large in period 1 and it is too small in period 0. The only way of getting closer
to her (unrestricted) optimal consumption stream is by choosing a lower tax rate in
p e r i o d0 .N o ww eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :
16Lemma 2 For all i, the indirect utility function Wi(τ) is single-peaked.
Proof. The function Wi(τ) can have three diﬀerent shapes, depending on the rela-
tionship between τi (the preferred tax rate without restrictions on savings) and e τi :
Case 1: τi < e τi. Then, Wi(τ) is single-peaked since, to the right of e τi,Wi(τ)=V ir(τ)
and V ir(τ) is a decreasing function to the right of e τi. The preferred tax rate is still
τi.
Case 2: τi > e τi. To the right of e τi,W i(τ)=V ir(τ). As both V i(τ) and V ir(τ) are
strictly concave and V i(e τi)=V ir(e τi), the preferred tax rate of i is τir, and not τi.
Moreover, we can prove that τir < τi. This follows from the ﬁrst order conditions
(23) and (29).
Case 3: τi = e τi. In this case we also have τi = τir. The preferred tax rate of this
agent is τi.
As a Corollary of the above lemma, the decisive agent is that individual whose
stock of human capital is the median of the distribution. If she has positive savings,
then τ∗ = τm. If, on the contrary, she is saving-constrained, τ∗ = τmr < τm.15
In the next section, we study several proposals to reform the pension system and
their eﬀect on the budget for public education.
5 Social Security Reform
5.1 Prefunding and Privatization
We focus on a pension system of the type described in Section 3.1, that is, a system
that combines a PAYGO scheme with MIRAs. In particular, we study the eﬀect of
an increase in the funded scheme at the expense of the PAYGO scheme. This is the
reason why we refer to this type of reform as “prefunding” and “privatization.” Here
increasing funding can be seen as promoting privatization of the pension system,
since the funds diverted from the PAYGO scheme are used to build up individual
accounts. Most of the proposed reforms of Social Security entail a diversion of funds
towards individuals retirement accounts. Th i si sb e c a u s eM I R A sn o r m a l l yy i e l d ,o n
15Also note that our assumption that ϕ
 (0) = +∞ implies that τ
∗ > 0.
17average, a higher return than the PAYGO scheme. Within our model, this means
that R>h1
h0, Part (i) of Assumption 1. However, two caveats are in order. First, even
when a funded scheme pays a higher return on average, this does not mean that all
individuals get a higher return under a funded scheme. If the original PAYGO scheme
is highly redistributive (α is very high), moving towards individual accounts likely
hurts those individuals with low wages. Second, the reform entails always transition
costs. Simply comparing between the return on assets and on Social Security taxes is
misleading. It amounts to comparing only two steady states of two diﬀerent worlds
(see Diamond (2000)). While the working cohort contributes more to the funded
scheme, somebody has to pay for current pension beneﬁts. This is sometimes called
t h ei m p l i c i td e b to ft h es y s t e m .T oi l l u s trate these issues, we consider three diﬀerent
possibilities of reform. The three proposals entail an increase in the contributions
to the MIRAs, starting in period 0. They diﬀer from the proposed change in the
PAYGO scheme. In the ﬁrst reform, the entire cost of the transition is borne by
current workers. In the second reform, there is a reduction in the PAYGO scheme in
both periods of the same size of the increase in the MIRAs. In the third reform, the
PAYGO scheme remains unchanged.
First type of Reform
We start with a reform in which the entire cost of the transition is paid by period
0 workers. Pensions for those who are retired in period 0 are cut. On the contrary,
future pensions of current workers lose part of the PAYGO beneﬁt. For example,
suppose that the initial pay-roll tax is 20%, from which a 1% goes to the MIRAs,





1 )=( 0 .19,0.01). After the reform, workers are required to increase
their contributions to the MIRAs, and the PAYGO scheme is reduced accordingly,
but only from period 1 onwards. Therefore, total contributions in period 1 will remain
the same after the reform as total contributions in period 0 before reform. In this
way, only period 0 workers pay for the cost of transition. For example, suppose
(λP 
0 ,λM 
0 )=( 0 .19,0.03) and (λP 
1 ,λM 
1 )=( 0 .17,0.03). Then, the total contributions
in each period after the reform are λ 
0 =0 .22 and λ 
1 = λ0 =0 .2, respectively.
18With this reform, pensions paid to the currently retired in period 0 do not change.
On the contrary, all workers will have less intertemporal income after the reform.
They increase their contributions to the MIRAs. In turn, they get an increase in
their pensions which is exactly the capitalized value of their increased contributions.
Still, their PAYGO beneﬁts are reduced.
To study the eﬀect of this reform on the support for public education, we have
to consider two diﬀerent cases depending on whether the median voter is saving-
constrained or not.
(i) The median voter is not saving-constrained. Condition (23) applies in this case.
The left-hand side is not aﬀected by this reform. The reform only aﬀects the right-
hand side. But it is obvious that the eﬀect of this reform is to reduce the positive








As this reform entails a reduction in λP
1 ,t h et e r m∂bi/∂τ, which represents the
marginal beneﬁt of the taxes for education, decreases. This implies that the median
now voter prefers a lower tax rate.
(ii) The median voter is saving-constrained. In this case we must see what happens
to the ﬁrst order condition (29). As the payroll tax in period 0 increases, the left-
hand side, which represents the marginal cost of the taxes for education, rises. The
right-hand side represents the marginal beneﬁt from the taxes for education. This
term is lower after the reform. Then, it is immediate that the eﬀect on the tax rate
is negative. The intuition behind this result is simple. As the median voter has less
intertemporal income, the only way to get closer to her previous choice is by choosing
a lower tax rate. This is now less costly in terms of future pensions since, after the
reform, the positive impact of public education on future pensions has reduced.
Second Type of Reform
We saw in the previous example that, if workers are forced to pay the whole
cost of the transition, there is a negative impact on the revenue to ﬁnance public
education. Now we move to the other polar case. We study a proposal of reform
19which transfers resources from the PAYGO scheme to the MIRAs, without changing
the total contribution to the system. If no additional resources are used, this implies
an immediate reduction of the pension beneﬁts paid to the old in period 0. This
means that the initial cost of the transitio n( i np e r i o d0 )i sp a i di nf u l lb yt h eo l d .
Although we believe that this reform is hardly feasible, the example is interesting
because, at ﬁrst sight, it seems that it will have little or no impact on the support
for public education.




1 )=( 0 .19,0.01). After the
reform, workers are required to increase their contributions to the MIRAs. In addi-





1 )=( 0 .17,0.03). Total contributions have not changed, that is, λ 
0 = λ 
1 =
λ0 =0 .2.
We distinguish again two cases so as to analyze the eﬀect of this reform on the
equilibrium level of the tax rate that ﬁnances public education:
(i) The median voter is not saving-constrained. From condition (23) we see that the
eﬀect is the same as with the previous reform. This means that increasing λM
0 at
the expense of λP
1 has the same negative eﬀect irrespective of whether the cost of the
transition is paid by the current workers or by the retired workers.
(ii) The median voter is saving-constrained. From condition (29) we see that the
eﬀect on the tax rate is again negative. This negative eﬀect, however, is now less
severe, since the marginal cost does not change.
Interestingly, even when the burden of the transition is paid mainly by the old,
the eﬀect on the subsidy for public education, which is paid by the current workers,
is negative.
Third Type of Reform: An “Incremental Reform”
In this third reform, the PAYGO scheme does not change and workers are required





1 )=( 0 .19,0.01) to (λP 
0 ,λM 
0 )=( λP 
1 ,λM 
1 )=( 0 .19,0.03). Total




In period 0 pensions remain unchanged. In contrast, current workers have to pay
20a greater contribution today, λ 
0, but their pension beneﬁts also increase in such a
way that they have the same intertemporal income. Thus, this reform is simply a
way of increasing savings in period 0, and it implies a sacriﬁce in consumption today
in exchange for consumption tomorrow. However, some workers may be worse-oﬀ
after the reform. This is so for workers who are saving-constrained. They would like
to increase consumption in period 0, at the cost of reducing consumption in period
1, but they cannot, since borrowing is not allowed. And this reform takes additional
income from period 0 and transfers it to period 1, moving this group of individuals
even farther from their optimum.
The impact of this reform on the subsidy to ﬁnance public education depends on
whether the median voter is saving-constrained or not:
(i) The median voter is not saving-constrained. From condition (23), we see that
neither the left-hand side nor the right-hand side change. This means that this
reform does not aﬀect the tax rate.
(ii) The median voter is saving-constrained. We study the ﬁrst order condition (29).
The eﬀect is exactly the same as in the ﬁrst reform. The marginal cost rises and
the marginal beneﬁt gets lower. Then, the tax rate preferred by the median voter is
lower after the reform.
Our previous analysis reveals that any reform of the pension system that weakens
this “link” between the pension system and public education, generates less support
for funds for public education. These reforms aﬀect the rate of return on the indi-
viduals’ contribution to public education, through the reduced PAYGO scheme and,
consequently, the willingness of society to pay taxes to ﬁnance education changes.
Naturally, as the output growth rate is endogenous in our framework and, on the
other hand, depends on the investment in public education, the overall rate of growth
of the economy may decrease. It is also remarkable that, even in the case of a reform
that does not aﬀect that link, a negative impact on the support for public educa-
tion can emerge. This can happen in the presence of borrowing constraints. The
existence of borrowing constraint restricts the share of disposable income that the
median-voter can devote to current consumption. The last type of reform that we
21have considered increases future consumption (via a higher pension beneﬁt) by low-
ering current consumption (by increasing the pay-roll tax). Therefore, the median
voter tries to restore her “initial” restricted optimum by voting for less funds for
public education. As a result, the output growth rate decreases.
5.2 Prefunding without Privatization
At last, in order to complete our analysis of the eﬀects of reforming the social security
system on taxes to ﬁnance public education, we must also study what would happen
in an hypothetical case in where these funds diverted from the PAYGO scheme are
used to build up a fund. In this way, the Social Security administration could try
to take advantage of the higher rate of return existing in the capital markets. Ac-
cording to our Assumption 1, the average return of the system rises by creating this
fund. We call this type of reform Prefunding without Privatization since under this
particular proposal both the PAYGO and the Funded scheme are subject to the same
redistribution factor (see Subsection 3.2).
We found out that this design of the system involves that qualitative identical
results for the tax rate, τ, can be established for the three reforms considered. We
skip the details, as it is a tedious repetition of the previous analysis.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We analyzed how diﬀerent proposals for reforming Social Security may aﬀect the sup-
port for public funding of education in the political process by which the educational
tax is determined. In our model, public funding of education increases the return of
the social security system by improving the human capital of next period workers. In
this context, current voters can expect to beneﬁt from the growth process through the
increased qualiﬁcation of labor and, consequently the higher future wages. All our
results are about the impact of exogenous changes in the pension system on the edu-
cation tax, that is endogenously chosen. We ignore the endogenous choice of the tax
to ﬁnance the pension system to avoid the problem of voting on a multidimensional
policy space, where typically equilibrium fails to exist.
22Our results suggest that most of the reforms considered entail a negative eﬀect
on the educational tax rate. We ﬁnd no eﬀect in the so-called“incremental”reform,
provided that the median income individual is not saving-constrained. Nevertheless,
according to Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996), individuals save little saving for retire-
ment, mostly due to the existence of Social Security. The median ﬁnancial assets of
households with heads aged 55-64 was only $8,300 in 1991, substantially less than
six months income. Except for Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k)
balances, the median was less than $3,000. Almost 20 percent of families had no ﬁ-
nancial assets at all. This means that the most plausible case from an empirical point
of view is a situation in which the median voter is saving-constrained, giving addi-
tional support to the situation in which the reform of Social Security has a negative
impact on the support for public education.
A possible criticism of our model is that only middle-aged agents take decisions
about the ﬁnancing of public education. In the case of young agents, this can be
easily justiﬁed if they are under the legal age to vote. In addition, we can consider
countries where there exists a mandatory education period and entry to labor markets
is restricted for young agents. On the other hand, we put aside the role played by the
old in the choice of ﬁscal policies, because we wish to focus on the possible eﬀects that
these reforms have on the accumulation of human capital. In fact, if assuming that
the old vote adds complexity to the model without changing the qualitative results
on the political support for public education.
A more general model including intergenerational altruism would modify the
quantitative but not the qualitative ﬁndings of our model.
As i m p l i ﬁed economy was examined here in order to clarify some aspects of the
social security reform that has not been studied in depth. We may draw the following
lesson: when proposing reforms of Social Security, they must be analyzed carefully in
case these reforms could have negative impacts on other public programs that aﬀect
the well-being of diﬀerent generations.
23Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
To check whether optimal savings are increasing in the stock of human capital, we





. This condition can be written
as:
u [(1 − τ − λ0)hi
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0 ] − ρRu [Rsi∗
0 + bi
1]=0 .
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. (30)
As u is concave, this expression is positive provided the numerator is negative. We
consider only the case in which the pension beneﬁtf o l l o w st h eM I R A sp e n s i o ns y s t e m
scheme, since the Trust Fund system is quite similar. Then, we have that savings
will rise with the stock of human capital if
(1 − τ − λ0)Ω ≥ λM
0 R + λP








1 ] is constant across individuals. When τ =0 , the condition
is:
(1 − λ0)Ω >R λM
0 , (32)
since h1(τ =0 )=0 . But (32) is a consequence of part (ii) of Assumption 1. To
see this, note that λ0 < Ω
Ω+R ⇒ λ0(Ω + R) < Ω ⇒ (1 − λ0)Ω >R λ0 ≥ RλM
0 .
When τ > 0, the left-hand side of equation (31) is a decreasing function of τ, while
the right-hand side is an increasing function of τ,s i n c eh1 is increasing in τ. Then,
there is a cut-oﬀ v a l u ef o rt h et a xr a t eτ, which we call τ. Condition (31) is true
for all τ < τ. By part (i) of Assumption 1, the right-hand side in equation (31) is
always lower than R(λM
0 + λP
1 (1 − α)), which in turn, by (iii), is also lower than
λ0R. A st h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ei sl o w e rt h a nλ0R, τ is above that value of τ that solves
(1−τ −λ0)Ω = λ0R, which is 1−λ0(Ω+R
Ω ). By part (ii) of Assumption 1, we obtain
that 1 − λ0(Ω+R
Ω ) > 0.
24A condition that guarantees that a PAYGO system is preferred by a ma-
jority of the population
If workers alone decide which system of Social Security should prevail, the fol-
lowing condition guarantees that the median voter prefers a PAYGO system, rather

























h0 = .75, and R =3 .24 (if annual interest rate is 4% and each
period has 30 years, then R =( 1 .04)30 =3 .2434). By Assumption 1, h1
h0 < 3.24. The
above condition sets a lower bound for the ratio h1
h0. This lower bound depends on
the parameter α. If α =1 /2 the condition requires h1
h0 > 2.78. If α =1 , it requires
h1
h0 > 2.43.
Alternatively, we could think of this condition as a requirement on the value of
α. In particular, it must be high enough. This is obvious since, when α =0 , nobody
wants a PAYGO system.
P r o o fo ft h ec o n c a v i t yo fyi(τ)
















∂τ2 is that of
∂2h1(τi)
∂τ2 . But the sign of
∂2h1(τi)
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